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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT E. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15571

DIONNE BRADLEY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries suffered by a
pedestrian when he was struck down by defendant's automobile
within a marked crosswalk.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which found that plaintiff
and defendant were equally negligent, resulting in a verdict
and judgment for the defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and remand for
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early evening of February 7, 1976, Robert Anderson,
plaintiff-appellant, was crossing Sunnyside Avenue at Guardsman
Way en route to a movie at the University of Utah.
no traffic control lights at the crossing.

There were

He was in a marked

crosswalk, walking from south to north, and was within about
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6 feet of the north curb when he was struck by an automobile
driven by Dionne Bradley, the defendant,and thrown several
feet (Ex. 1-P, R 155), landing at the side of the road,
partly in the roadway and partly on the sidewalk.

He was

taken by paramedics to the University Hospital, where he was
to be confined in bed for the next two months

(R 302).

When admitted to the hospital, plaintiff was unconscious,
had obvious injuries to both legs in the region of the
thigh, plus multiple bruises, and injuries to his head.

He

remained in intensive care for several days and was ultimately transferred to the general ward (R 295).
Both of plaintiff's thigh bones were fractured.

The

fracture of the left leg was comminuted, with one large
piece and some smaller pieces knocked off the bone.

It was

necessary to treat this fracture with a pin through the
upper end of the shin bone and the leg in traction to keep
it relatively straight (R 296) .

The injury to the right leg

was higher, near the hip, and the bone was completely broken
with piercing of the skin, an open fracture.

Surgery was

necessary to insert an intermedullary nail to keep the bone
in place, the nail being driven in from the top of the hip
bone down through the shaft across the fracture site, and
far enough that the nail fit snuggly inside the bone (R 299).
While plaintiff was in the hospital, infection developed
in one of the legs, requiring treatment with antibiotics,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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and he was in traction for about six weeks of his stay in
the hospital, after which time he was given physical therapy
until his release from the hospital on April 7 (R 302).
After his release from the hospital, pulmonary embolism,
which was a result of the fractures, necessitated his being
hospitalized again for more than a week (R 303).

His leg

was in a cast until July 4, some five months after the
accident, and he suffered permanent disability (R 209, 252).
As a result of the injuries and the resulting disabilities and treatment, plaintiff incurred costs at the University
of Utah Medical Center in the amount of $12,798.94, at
University Radiology Associates for $504.50, and miscellaneous costs of $2,660.48, or total expenses of $15,963.92
(Exs. 22-P and 23-P).
The case was submitted to the jury on a general verdict
with special interrogatories, which resulted in a verdict
and judgment of no cause of action, the jury having found
that plaintiff and defendant were equally negligent.

The

trial court denied a motion for a new trial, and this appeal
was taken.
ARGUMENT
The jury's finding that plaintiff and defendant were each
50% negligent is contrary to the evidence and wrong as a matter
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of law; and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial
was an abuse of discretion.
The enactment of the Comparative Negligence Law, 78-27-37
et seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires some reconsideration
of the roles of trial and appellate judges in controlling
errant jurors, particulary with reference to their findings
as to the relative degrees of negligence of the parties.
A comparative negligence trial differs markedly from one
involving common law contributory negligence.

Under the prior

practice, a motion for a directed verdict was available to test
the issues of negligence and contributory negligence in the
first instance.

The judge could decide, in some cases, whether

there was sufficient evidence for a finding of negligence,
on the one hand, or contributory negligence, on the other.
In a comparative negligence case, however, it seems to be
almost out of the question for the trial judge to direct the
jury on apportionment.

Even if he were convinced that the

plaintiff was entitled to recover, it would not be his function
to arrive at percentage figures.
system.

To do so would subvert the

It is the jury's function to determine, within

limits, the percentage of negligence attributable to each.
Accordingly, the trial judge must assume his supervisory role
through the granting or denying of motions for a new trial.
The present case is a classic example of a jury gone
wrong, and a trial judge's failure to exercise that superSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for -digitization
4 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vision essential to the proper administration of justice.

It

is not a case in which there was serious disagreement as to
how an accident happened.

It is a case in which the court

should have set aside a clearly erroneous determination.
Review of the evidence is necessary, but that relating
to the accident itself was not lengthy, and it was not
contradictory.
scene:

There were only three eye witnesses at the

the plaintiff, the defendant, and Raymond Ward, who

was following the defendant in another vehicle.
The accident occurred at about 6:30 o'clock p.m. on
February 7, 1976, on Sunnyside Avenue at Guardsman Way.
Sunnyside Avenue is a wide street (about 70 feet where plaintiff
was crossing) and has marked traffic lanes, left turn lanes,
and pedestrian lanes.

It is marked for two lanes of travel

in each direction, and there are mercury vapor street lights
at the intersection (Ex. 1-P) .
Just before the accident, Raymond W. Ward was driving
west down Sunnyside, approximately four to five car lengths
behind the defendant's vehicle (R 155).

It was early dusk

on a clear day, still quite light (R 154).

Ward could see

through the rear window and windshield of defendant's automobile, and through her windows observed that there was a
pedestian in the way almost directly in front of defendant.
He knew that the pedestrain would be hit if defendant didn't
apply her brakes immediately.

By the time the car struck
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the plaintiff, he had walked a few more steps since Ward had
first seen him.

The car hit the pedestrain and boosted him

over to the right of the road where he landed at the curb
line (R 155).

When ward first observed him, plaintiff was

on the north or destination side of the road.

He was struck

at a point approximately six feet from the curb.

The witness

did not see any sign of brakes being applied by the defendant
until after the plaintiff was struck, nor did he notice the
car slow down (R 156).

The witness and the defendant were

both going at a rate of about 35 to 40 miles per hour (R
157).

When Ward first observed him, plaintiff was four or

five car lengths in front of the defendant's car and didn't
seem to be aware that the car was bearing down on him.

He

was walking at a medium to fast gait (R 162-163).
The defendant testified both by deposition and in
person.

She was driving by herself, west on Sunnyside

Avenue, saw a pedestrian in the crosswalk and swerved to the
left and behind him, hitting him with her right headlight.
She was in the right-hand lane of westbound traffic and she
guessed about 50 feet from plaintiff when she first saw him.
She said she was traveling at about 30 miles per hour (R
183).

She didn't apply the brakes before hitting him, but

only swerved.

Contrary to Ward's testimony, she stated that

she had her headlights on at the time, on low beam.

When

she first saw plaintiff, he was in the middle of the rightSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-Act,6administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hand lane, the one in which she was traveling.

There was no

traffic to impede her and she attempted to swerve left
toward the middle lane. Plaintiff was in the middle of the
right-hand lane when she hit him (R 184) at the right headlight of her automobile.

Plaintiff was then about five feet

from the curb (R 185) and in the crosswalk when defendant
hit him.

She drove along Sunnyside Avenue on a daily basis

and was aware of the existence of the crosswalks in that
area (R 186).

At the time of the accident she was in the

northern lane of the westbound traffic (R 322).

It was

dark, she said, and she had her headlights on low beam (R
322).

She was traveling at about 30 miles per hour.

Although she testified that plaintiff was about 50 feet away
when she first observed him, she testified on cross-examination
that she was just entering the intersection at about the
eastern crosswalk (R 326) -- a distance of about 85 feet
from where she hit plaintiff.
by street lights

The intersection was lighted

(R 327).

The plaintiff testified that he was a student at the
University of Utah, and on the evening of February 7 he was
walking to the University to see a film.

He was walking

north along Greenwood Terrace, reached the corner of Greenwood Terrace and Sunnyside Avenue, stopping at the curb to
look for traffic to his left.

As he reached the curb, he

let two cars ~ass him, then proceeded north across Sunnyside,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding- for7digitization
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glancing to the right.

He saw a car some distance away

approaching from the east, but he believed it to be far
enough away and moving slowly enough that he could cross the
street with safety.

The next thing he remembered was having

been struck and lying on the ground (R 192, 222).

After

being struck he was in and out of consciousness, lying
partly in the road.

He testified that he may have sensed

his danger a split second before impact (R 222).

After

being taken to the hospital, he gained and lost consciousness
repeatedly (R 224), and after some delay was sedated and
given a pain killer (R 225).
At plaintiff's typical stride, there were about 28
paces from curb to curb on Sunnyside.

It took him about

eight seconds to reach the median line on Sunnyside and
about four seconds more to get to the line separating the
two northern lanes

(R 265), just south of where he was

struck.
The only other witness to testify concerning the events
surrounding the accident was Artie Banks, Jr., a Salt Lake
City police officer who investigated the accident.

When he

arrived at the scene, he observed the plaintiff at the curb
and gutter, lying across the curb and gutter, the upper
portion of his body approximately on the sidewalk, and the
lower half on the roadway.
pain (R 167).

He was conscious but in extreme

Banks talked to the defendant who told him

that she did not see plaintiff until it was too late, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that she attempted to move away from his direction by
turning the wheel, but was unsuccessful (R 168).

The point

of impact was near the center or right of center in the
crosswalk in the far "right-handmost lane".

The distance

from point of impact to where plaintiff was lying was approximately 20 feet.

He had been struck by the right front

fender and bumper.

Banks testified that he talked to plain-

tiff later in the hospital, and that plaintiff told him that
he had reached approximately the midpoint of the intersection,
had seen a vehicle coming and attempted to sprint across the
roadway, making it as far as the right-hand lane, and at
that point he saw that the vehicle was going to continue and
tried to jump out of the way (R 169).

(This version, if

told to Banks at all, was told while plaintiff was in and
out of consciousness, in great pain, and probably drugged.
It is inconsistent with the descriptions of the three
persons who were there.)
In addition to giving customary instructions on negligence, the court instructed the jury specifically with
respect to the relative duties of pedestrians and motor
vehicle operators.

Among the instructions given were the

following:
A driver of a motor vehicle has a duty not to
drive the vehicle on a highway at a speed gre~ter
then is reasonable and prudent under the condLtions, and having regard to the actual.and potential hazards then existing, and speed LS to be.so
controlled as may be necessary to avoid collLdLng
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with any person, vehicle or other conveyance on or
entering the highway, in compliance with legal
requirements and the duty of all persons to use
due care. The statutes also require that the
driver of a vehicle shall, consistent with the
foregoing, drive at an appropriate reduced speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection, or
when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic, or by reason of weather
or highway conditions.
(R 53)
A driver of a motor vehicle is required to yield
the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if
necessary to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing
the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian
is upon the half of the roadway upon which the
vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is
approaching so closely from the opposite half of
the roadway as to be in danger.
The person having the right-of-way may assume that
the other will yield.
Failure of defendant to so
yield the right-of-way to plaintiff would constitute
negligence on defendant's part, if you so find. (R
54)
It is the duty of every operator of a motor vehicle
to exercise ordinary care and keep a careful
lookout ahead and about him.
The exercise of
ordinary care requires him to make observations at
a point or points where his observations will be
efficient for protection from injury to persons or
property, requires a seasonable and effective use
of a driver's sense of sight to observe timely,
not only the presence, location and movement of
other users of the highway, pedestrians as well as
vehicles, but traffic signs and signals, obstructions to vision, and everything else with might
warn him of possible danger.
(R 55)
Before attempting to cross a street that is being
used for the traffic of motor vehicles, it is a
pedestrian's duty to make reasonable observations
to learn the traffic conditions confronting him;
to look to that vicinity from which, were a
vehicle approaching, it would immediately endanger
his passing; and to make the determination which a
reasonably prudent person would make under the
same circumstances as to whether it is reasonably
- 10 provided
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

safe to attempt the crossing. What observations
he should make, and what he should do for his own
safety, while crossing the street are matters
which the law does not attempt to regulate in
detail and for all occasions, except in this
respect:
it places upon him the continuing duty
to exercise the care a reasonably prudent person
would observe to avoid an accident.
(R 58)
In determining whether the plaintiff was negligent
with respect to his own safety, you may take into
account the fact that a pedestrian crossing a busy
street must be constantly vigilant for his safety
with respect to all of the conditions around him,
and that even if a car is seen approaching, unless
it is so positioned as to constitute an immediate
hazard to him, he is not necessarily obliged to
focus full and undivided attention on that particular car and so calculate his entire conduct as to
avoid being struck by it.
He need not anticipate
that the driver will speed, fail to observe, fail
to control her car, fail to afford him the right:
of way, or otherwise be negligent unless, in the
exercise of ordinary care, he observes or should
have observed something to warn him of such improper conduct.
(R 59)
Although inconsistent in some minor respects, the
instructions were substantially correct, and no exceptions
were taken to them.
Under the law, and under the court's instructions,
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that
the plaintiff was as negligent as the defendant, and the
trial court should have granted plaintiff's motion for a new
trial.

Where a motion for a new trial has been granted or

denied, this court may review the evidence for the purpose
of determining whether the trial court abused its discretion
in ruling on the motion.

Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric
- 11 -
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Association, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, 396 (1970);
Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 P. 300, 305 (1908).
We are not unmindful of the cases in which this court
has stated that it will not reverse an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial unless there has been a
clear abuse of discretion, but most cases have dealt with
situations in which the court granted a motion for a new
trial, such as in King v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d 692 (1949); and Brown v. Johnson, 24
Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970).
In Moser v. ZCMI, 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948)

the

court did consider a ruling of the trial court denying a
motion for a new trial, and said:
The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down by
this court, is that where a motion for a new trial
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict, the trial court will not be
held to have abused this discretion in denying the
motion unless there is no substantial evidence in
the record to support the verdict.
Therefore, if reasonable minds could have found as
the jury did in this case, from the evidence before
it, then we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for
a new trial on the grounds of this insufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict.
Cases on the scope of appellate review of orders
granting motions for new trial do not provide much guidance
with respect to appellate review of orders denying motions
for new trial.
(N.D.

As said in Olson v. Thompson, 74 N.W. 2d 432

1956):

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Orders granting new trials, on ground of insufficency of evidence, stand on a firmer toundation
in a reviewing court then orders denying new
trials, since such orders are not decisive of the
case, but only open the way to reinvestigation of
the entire case on its facts and merits.
See also Pacta v. Kleppe Corporation, 154 N.w. 2d 177,
183 (N.D. 1967).
Moreover, the restrictions appellate courts have
placed upon themselves in reviewing evidence are of doubtful
worth in connection with apportionment of negligence by
trial juries under comparative negligence statutes.

Some

courts in administering comparative negligence statutes have
seen the need for more judicial supervision of the
findings.

~'-~r:.r's

Schwartz, Comparative Negligence Manual, § 1050,

comments favorably upon the granting of a new trial by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, even where ordinary procedures had
not been followed:
The Graff case [Graff v. Gerber, 26 Wis.2d 72, 131
N.W.2d 866 (1954)] shows the versatility of the
comparative law concept.
The trial technique
illustrates the effort to avoid repeated litigation.
When the supervision of the trial court
over the jury's verdict and the supervision of the
Supreme Court over the trial court's decision in
the interests of justice are combined, the chances
there are lessened.
This ingenious concept preserves the adversary
system and jury trials, and avoids the evils of
passion and prejudice and the desire of the jury
to see one side either win or loss. The jury
should be purely a fact finding body. While the
concept is not perfect, one must conclude that ~t
is a giant step forward in solving the legal
uncertainties of the accident victim. No quarrel
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding -for digitization
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can be had with the goal of making each tortfeasor
pay for the wrong he committed. No quarrel can be
had with evaluating the damages caused to each
accident victim by a fair and reasonable standard
of proof. No quarrel can be had with a procedure
that has built in supervision in the event of
error or injustice to any party.
The state of Wisconsin has been a leader in the comparative negligence field, and its courts have shown leadership
in exercising necessary controls and supervision over errant
juries.
Loomans v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company, 38 Wis.
2d 656, 158 N.W. 2d 318

(1968~

arose out of an automobile

accident in which the plaintiff slowed her car suddenly,
having observed an accident ahead, skidded, and was struck
by the defendant's automobile, which had been following
behind her.

The jury apportioned 60% percent of the cause

of negligence to the plaintiff and 40% to the defendant.
The trial court granted a motion for a new trial, but failed
to follow the required procedure.

The Wisconsin Supreme

Court, on review, exercised its discretionary power to grant
a new trial.

Discussing the comparison of negligence ques-

tion, and the reason for granting the new trial, the court
said:
It is contended by the defendant that the comparison of negligence is peculiarly for the jury
and therefore cannot be upset or be a basis for
granting a new trial in the interest of justice.
This is an erroneous view.
While it may not be
often that this court upsets a comparison of
negligence, the court has done so as a matter of
law and reversed for error. A comparison may also
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be the basis of a new trial in the interest of
justice when the comparison is against the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence
although this court cannot as a matter of law say
that it was wrong.
[Citations omitted.]
In the instant case, the trial court believed the
comparison was wrong and the plaintiff Edma Loomans'
negligence could not be equal to or greater than
that of the defendant Lewin's but the court granted
the new trial on the ground of interest of justice.
It might have been placed on the ground of error.
In Korleski v. Lane, 10 Wis.2d 163, 102 N.W.2d 234 (1960), a
jury had returned a verdict of 50% causal negligence on the
part of plaintiff, a motion for new trial had been denied,
and judgment had been entered on the verdict.

On appeal the

Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and ordered a new trial
in the interest of justice.
In Spath v. Sereda, 41 Wis. 2d 448, 164 N.W. 2d 246
(1969), the court held that where the jury findings were
contrary to the great weight of evidence, even though
supported by credible evidence, a new trial might be granted
in the interest of justice, and that the rule applied alike
to questions of damages, negligence, causation, and comparison of negligence.
155 N.W.2d 650

See also Pruss v. Strube, 37 Wis.2d 539,

(1968).

Wisconsin differs from Utah in that it has a statute
permitting its supreme court to grant a new trial "in the
interest of justice," and Utah does not.

But this court has

recognized that denial of a motion for new trial may be
reversed if it constituted an abuse of discretion, and there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is no reason why this court may not determine as a matter of
common law that there is an abuse of discretion if the
decision of the trial court results in a miscarriage of
justice.

"Abuse of discretion" is a term of uncertain

meaning.

In Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 919 (1955),

the court stated:
lfuat are the tests for such abuse of discretion?
* * * When all is said and done, however, the
question by its very nature is one for which there
can be no rule of thumb answer.
Attempts at
defining or making more certain and exact the
tests of abuse of discretion do not usually
furnish reliable guide posts, nor tend to clarify
the rule.
Under any test, or any approach, the judgment should be
reversed in thls case because of the trial court's failure
to grant the new trial.
As pointed out above, this was not a case in which the
evidence was in conflict in any material points, and the
presumption given to the validity of the trial court's
rulings should apply only to those parts of a trial in which
personal presence and personal observation are of importance.

When controlling facts are not in dispute, the scope

of this court's review should be greater.

A case in point

is American Life Insurance Company v. Williams, 234 Ala.
469, 175 So. 554, 112 A.L.R. 1215, 1218 (1937), which
involved the question of whether the insured had died of a
pulmonary disease, in which event the policy would not have
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covered the death.

The defendant had sought a new trial

after a verdict for the plaintiff, but it was denied.

The

court said:
The next question is whether the motion for a new
trial should have been granted because it was
against the great weight of the evidence. When
such a motion is denied by the trial court, and
the verdict is largely dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses, to reverse the judgment
on that motion the weight of the evidence must be
so strong that there can be no reasonable doubt
but that the verdict was the result of passion,
prejudice, bias, favor, or some other motive which
should not be controlling.
[Citations omitted]
The same is true in respect to matters in the
discretion of the jury. [Citation omitted]
But when the evidence is without dispute in material
respects, and the question hinges on a proper
interpretation of it, the rule is different,
whether at law or in equity.
(Citations omitted]
Another case recognizing limitations on the trial
court's discretion is Dolson v. Anastasia, 5 N.J. 2, 258
Atl.2d 706

(1969), a motor vehicle rear-end collison case in

which the jury had returned a verdict of no cause of action
and plaintiff had moved for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

The

trial court denied the motion, and the appellate division
felt compelled to affirm the trial court's order in light of
what it considered its limited review power.

The New Jersey

Supreme Court reversed noting the differences between a
motion for a new trial after a jury verdict as against the
weight of the evidence, a motion for involuntary dismissal,
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a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence, and
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

It pointed

out that the tests in those latter types of motions are
different from the one in case of a motion for a new trial
as against the weight of the evidence, and said:
The standard governing an appellate tribunal's
review of a trial court's action on a new trial
motion is essentially the same as that controlling
the trial judge. Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 212,
81 Atl.2d 155 (1951) very correctly so held, at
the same time putting to rest all constitutional
questions and casting aside any more restrictive
"abuse of discretion test." We say the test is
"essentially the same", because where certain
aspects are important--witness credibility,
"demeanor", "feel of the case", or other criteria
which are not transmitted by the written record--,
the appellate court must give deference to the
views of the trial judge thereon.
His decision,
however, is not entitled to any special deference
where it rests upon a determination as to worth,
plausibility, consistency or other tangible considerations apparent from the face of the record with
respect to which he is no more peculiarly situated
to decide than the appellate court. * * *
It consequently behooves the trial judges in
deciding new trial motions to spell out fully the
reasons for their determinations so that reviewing
tribunals may be advised of the extent to which
factors entitled to deference entered into the
decision.
In this case the trial judge did not spell out his
reasons, and there were no factors that were entitled to
this court's deference.

The evidence of the three eye

witnesses to the accident establish the physical facts
without serious dispute.

The plaintiff was crossing a wide
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street, approximately 70 feet from curb to curb.

The

defendant was proceeding down a wide street that was marked
with four travel lanes.

She was in the most right hand

lane, the one nearest to the north curb, and the one farthest from the point at which plaintiff had left the curb.
When the impact occurred, the plaintiff was in the middle of
the northernmost lane, approximately 65 feet from where he
had left the curb and about 6 feet from being safely across.
He was first seen by defendant when he was about in the
middle of her car, which was in the middle of the far right
lane.

The speed of his gait and the speed of the automobiles,

whether as testified to by defendant or by the witness
Raymond Ward, were such that when the plaintiff left the
middle of the mid-point of the roadway and stepped into the
half of the roadway in which defendant was driving her
automobile, the defendant must have been in a position that
would have permitted her to stop, or at least to slow enough
to permit the plaintiff to reach a point of safety.
not stop.

She did not attempt to stop.

She did

She did not slow or

attempt to slow, but took the easy way, hoping to miss him
without impeding her journey to the library.
And the plaintiff was visible.

Ward saw him through

defendant's automobile when the plaintiff was four to five
car lengths in front of defendant's automobile, and defendant's
automobile was four or five car lengths in front of Mr. \liard.
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If she was traveling at a rate of 30 miles per hour, as she
said, she would have been moving at a rate of 44 feet per
second and if she was just entering the intersection, as she
said, at the pedestrian crosswalk on the east side of the
intersection, she would have had two seconds within which to
apply her brakes and take evasive action.

She would not

have had to slow much, because the plaintiff was within
inches of safety when he was struck by her right headlight.
As the court instructed the jury, the plaintiff had a
right to assume that the defendant would slow or would stop
and permit him to proceed across the street, and this is
true whether or not he saw the defendant's vehicle.

The

jury must have been overly impressed by the fact that the
plaintiff didn't see the oncoming car, and while the failure
to see may have been negligence, it was not a cause of the
accident, because if he had seen the vehicle, he would have
had the right to assume it would yield the right-of-way to
him.

In Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680, 685

(1954), an auto-pedestian case, the court discussed the
causation question.
This court has on numerous occasions dealth with
that principle.
In the case of Lowder v. Holley
[233 P.2d 350, 352] defendants strenuously urged
that the admitted failure of plaintiff Lowder to
see defendant's truck approaching the intersection
made plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law which precluded his recovery.
But the court, through Mr. Justice Wade, made very
clear the thought above expressed, reasoning that
- 20 provided
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because, the evidence was susceptible of a finding
that when plaintiff stopped at the intersection
the approaching truck was far enough away to have
afforded plaintiff an opportunity to safely cross,
that the plaintiff "* * * could have assumed and
acted on the assumption that the driver of the
truck would exercise ordinary and reasonable care
in his driving and that it would be safe to cross
the intersection. * * * Under such a state of
facts Amasa Lowder's failure to see the truck
could in no way have contributed to the accident."
(Emphasis added.) In other words, even if he had
seen the approaching truck, it could have been
found, consistent with due care for plaintiff to
assume that he would be afforded his right-of-way
because of entering the intersection first, and
proceed across. So the accident might well have
happened just as it did, whether Lowder saw the
defendant or not.
Moreover, assuming that both plaintiff and defendant
were somewhat inattentive, and the inattention of each was
a cause of the accident, this does not legitimize a SO-SO
apportionment.

The differing duties of the motorist on the

one hand and the pedestrian on the other were observed by
this court in Coombs v. Perry, supra, 2 Utah 2d 381, 27S
P. 2d 680,

682 (19S2)

(19S4):

It is to be borne in mind that although the
motorist and pedestrian are both required to
exercise the same standard of care, that of the
ordinary prudent person under the circumstances,
that standard imposes upon the motorist a greater
amount of caution than upon the pedestrian because
of the potential danger to others in the operations of an automobile.
It is submitted that it was a miscarriage of justice,
an abuse of discretion, an error in law, for the trial judge
to let the judgments stand.
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But, it may be argued, what of the testimony of Officer
Banks?

The answer is that his testimony should have no

weight.

It was contrary to the testimony of all three of

the persons involved at the scene.

Ward, who observed the

accident through the defendant's automobile, did not see
plaintiff sprint, but observed him walking at a medium to
fast gait; the defendant took the stand and testified but
said nothing about a sprint from the middle of the roadway;
and the plaintiff himself testified that he became aware of
the presence of the automobile only a instant before the
impact.
The defendant's testimony is important because she had
the plaintiff barely moving--she said he was at the middle
the right-hand lane when she first saw him and was in the
middle when she hit him (R 184).
sprinting.

He couldn't have been

Moreover, Banks spent only 5 minutes at the

hospital with the plaintiff on the evening of the accident,
when plaintiff was in and out of consciousness and under
sedation.
Banks' testimony, of course, was placed before the jury
and may well have had some effect on its deliberations.

The

testimony varied from a statement previously given to plaintiff's counsel.

On March 29, 1976, less than two months

after the accident, Banks had stated:

- 22 -
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After I had investigated the scene of the accident
I went to the hospital and spoke with Robert
Anderson. He was in severe pain but did indicate
to me that he saw the car but could not get out of
the way before it struck him. He was wearing
light clothing, i.e., brown cords and a light
colored jacket.
The prior statement was pointed out to the trial judge
in plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and while the surprise, in itself, might not have been sufficient for the
granting a new trial, it was one factor that contributed to
a miscarriage of justice, along with the insufficiency of
the evidence, and defense counsel's "shackle" remarks in his
summation (R 364).
CONCLUSION
The jury made an error of such magnitude as to indicate
that the jurors had either ignored or failed to understand
the instructions given them by the trial judge.

They failed

to give consideration to the greater responsibility and duty
of the driver of a motor vehicle, and they failed to recognize
plaintiff's right-of-way and his right to rely on it.

The

jury's finding that plaintiff and defendant were each 50%
negligent is not supported by the evidence, it is contrary
to law, and it is contrary to the instructions given by the
court.
A motion for a new trial was made to the trial court on
the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, the surprise resulting from the testimony of Officer Banks, and the
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prejudice resulting from defense counsel's remarks about
defendant's being "shackled" with a judgment.

The jury

verdict cannot be justified, and the court should have
granted a new trial.

Inasmuch as it did not do so, this

court should remand the case with directions to grant a new
trial, so that the plaintiff may receive some compensation
for the serious injuries the defendant inflicted upon him.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Bryce E. Roe
Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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